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Although critics may dismiss it as a mere empirical
correlation masquerading as a tradeoff, the Phillips
curve relationship between inflation and unemploy-
ment has nevertheless been a key component of
macroeconomic models for the past 25 years. In
1960 Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow [16, p. 192]
named the relationship after A. W. Phillips, the New
Zealand economist who in 1958 gave it its best known
(but hardly its first) modern formulation (see Fig-
ure 1). Since then it has evolved through at least
five successive versions as analysts sought to expand
its explanatory power, its theoretical content, its
policy relevancy, and its ability to fit the facts.
Phillips’ [15, p. 290] initial wage-change version
w=f (U) related the rate of wage inflation w via the
function f( ) to the excess demand for labor as
measured by U, the deviation of unemployment from
its equilibrium or labor-market clearing rate. Trans-
formed through the assumed markup of prices over
wages into the price-change equation p=f (U), where
p is the rate of price inflation, it was widely inter-
preted as a stable enduring tradeoff or menu of
inflation-unemployment combinations from which the
authorities could choose. In its shift-adjusted form
p=f (U)+Z, it incorporated a vector of variables Z,
including past price changes, trade union effects,
unemployment dispersion, demographic factors and
the like, to account for observed shifts in the inflation-
unemployment tradeoff or menu of policy choices.
In its expectations-augmented form p-p
e=f(U),
where p
e is the expected rate of inflation, it asserted
(1) that the tradeoff is between unemployment and
unexpected inflation, (2) that the tradeoff vanishes
when expectations are realized, and (3) that unem-
ployment returns to its natural equilibrium rate at
this point. Provided expectations adjust to actual
inflation with a lag, it also implied the accelerationist
notion that unemployment can be pegged permanently
below its natural rate only if inflation is continually
accelerated so as to always stay a step ahead of ex-
pectations. That is, while denying a permanent trade-
off between unemployment and the rate of inflation,
it implied that there may be a permanent tradeoff
between unemployment and the rate of acceleration of
inflation.
The preceding versions reflect a non-market-
clearing view of the world, expressing as they do the
disequilibrium response of wages and prices to a
mismatching of demand and supply in the labor
market. By contrast, the alternative New Classical
or market clearing version U=g(p-p
e) assumes
that the labor market is always in equilibrium and
that deviations of unemployment from its natural
rate stem solely from inflation misperceptions and
vanish when those misperceptions end. When com-
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(according to which actual inflation differs from
expected inflation only by a random forecast error)
this version says that tradeoffs are solely the result
of unpredictable random shocks and cannot be ex-
ploited by systematic (predictable) policies.
The foregoing interpretations are well known. Not
so well known, however, is the origin and early his-
tory of the inflation-unemployment relationship. For
the most part, textbooks typically trace the idea to
Phillips’ famous 1958 Economica article without say-
ing anything about what went before. They correctly
describe the five versions of the Phillips curve out-
lined above. But they fail to note that at least three
of those versions (including the version presented by
Phillips himself) had already been spelled out long
before Phillips. The result is to neglect at least ten
predecessors whose names deserve to be associated
with the Phillips curve. In an effort to redress this
oversight and to set the record straight, the para-
graphs below document what Phillips’ predecessors
had to say about the inflation-unemployment rela-
tionship.
John Law (1671-1729)
It is probably unrealistic to expect to find a
Phillips curve in the writings of John Law, the
famous eighteenth century banker and finance mini-
ster whose schemes to promote economic development
via the creation of a paper currency secured by land
ended with the collapse of the Mississippi Bubble in
1720. To be sure, he believed that money stimulates
real activity. But he also believed that it does so at
constant or even decreasing prices owing to the
availability of idle resources and scale economies in
production. As a result, there is either no Phillips
curve inflation-unemployment relation in his analysis
or it works in the wrong direction-falling unem-
ployment being associated with falling, not rising,
prices.
David Hume (1711-1776)
The prototypal Phillips curve analysis is to be
found in the writings of the eighteenth century Scot-
tish philosopher-economist David Hume. As early
as 1752, he presented the essentials of a Phillips curve
relationship of the form U=g(dP/dt), where U is
the deviation of unemployment from its natural
(equilibrium) rate and dP/dt is the change in the
price level with respect to time. This relationship
derived straight from his assumption that unemploy-
ment disturbances stem from price perception errors
(the difference between actual and perceived prices)
and that such errors persist only when prices are
changing. Expressed symbolically, he assumed that
U = h(P-P
E) and
P-P
E = k dP/dt
where P and P
E denote actual and perceived prices
and k is a coefficient relating price perception errors
to price level changes. Substitution of the latter
equation into the former yields Hume’s version of the
Phillips curve U=g(dP/dt) mentioned above. That
version embodied his hypothesis that one must con-
tinually raise prices to peg unemployment at arbi-
trarily low levels since only by doing so can one
produce the price perception errors that sustain the
tradeoff. In short, Hume’s explanation stresses the
employment effects of unperceived monetary-induced
price changes. He [8, pp. 37-40] says:
though the high price of commodities be a neces-
sary consequence of the encrease of gold and silver,
yet it follows not immediately upon that encrease;
but some time is required before the money circu-
lates through the whole state and makes its effect
be felt on all ranks of people. At first, no alter-
ation is perceived; by degrees the price rises, first
of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at
last reaches a just proportion with the new quan-
tity of specie . . . . In my opinion, it is only in
this interval or intermediate situation, between the
acquisition of money and rise of prices, that the
encreasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable
to industry . . . . From the whole of this reasoning
we may conclude, that it is of no manner of conse-
quence, with regard to the domestic happiness of a
state, whether money be in a greater or less quan-
tity. The good policy of the magistrate consists
only in keeping it, if possible, still encreasing;
because, by that means, he keeps alive a spirit of
industry in the nation . . . . There is always an
interval before matters be adjusted to their new
situation; and this interval is as pernicious to in-
dustry, when gold and silver are diminishing, as it
is advantageous when these metals are encreasing.
Three points stand out in Hume’s analysis [10].
First, the tradeoff is between unemployment and un-
perceived changes in money and prices; it vanishes
once perceptions fully adjust to reality. Second,
price perceptions, though slow to adjust, eventually
catch up to one-time changes in the level of money
and prices. It follows that such changes can at best
generate temporary but not permanent tradeoffs.
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to generate a continual succession of changes in
money and prices. Hume here makes the distinctly
non-rational-expectations argument that such changes
will, because of the lag in the adjustment of price
perceptions, keep prices forever marching a step
ahead of perceptions, perpetually frustrating the
latter’s attempts to catch up. In this way, he claims,
the gap between actual and perceived prices will be
maintained thus permanently lowering unemploy-
ment. Hume notes that this process works symmet-
rically for price deflation-such deflation, if pro-
longed, producing an enduring rise in unemployment.
It follows at once that a permanent tradeoff U=
g(dP/dt) exists between unemployment and the rate
of change of money and prices. One must therefore
agree with Charles R. Nelson’s [14, p. 2] recent
judgment that
Hume was clearly of the opinion that the level of
activity would be raised permanently by a steady
increase in the quantity of money, prices, and
wages. Hume was therefore a believer in a stable,
long-run Phillips curve.
Henry Thornton ( 1760-1815)
Like Hume, Henry Thornton also described a
Phillips curve of the form U=g(dP/dt), where the
variables are as defined above [10]. In his classic
An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper
Credit of Great Britain (1802) he [19, p. 237] says
that a monetary expansion stimulates employment
by raising prices:
. . . additional industry will be one effect of an
extraordinary emission of paper, a rise in the cost
[i.e., price] of articles will be another. Probably
no small part of that industry which is excited by
new paper is produced through the enhancement of
the cost of commodities.
This same tradeoff, he [19, p. 238] notes, also holds
in reverse as monetary and price deflation bring
painful rises in unemployment.
If we assume the augmented paper to be brought
back to its ordinary quantity, we must suppose
industry to languish for a time through the ill
success [of] mercantile transactions.
In his discussion of the Phillips curve, Thornton
was careful to distinguish between alternative levels
of money and prices and continuous changes of those
variables. Only the latter, he said, can affect real
activity and sustain the tradeoff. This is epitomized
in his [19, p. 256] remark that “it is the progressive
augmentation of bank paper, and not the magnitude
of its existing amount, which gives the relief.” In
other words, money and prices stimulate activity only
when they are continually increasing. For, says
Thornton [19, p. 238], “While paper is encreasing,
and articles continue rising, mercantile speculations
appear more than ordinarily profitable.” But “as
soon . . . as the circulating medium ceases to en-
crease, the extra profit is at an end,” and the stimulus
vanishes. Thus a one-time rise in the money stock
and level of prices cannot sustain the tradeoff. In-
stead, a continuous increase or “progressive augmen-
tation” is required. The tradeoff is between output
and the rate of change of prices.
As for the tradeoff’s source, Thornton attributed it
chiefly to a tendency for money wages to consistently
lag behind prices. He explicitly stated (1) that
inflation stimulates activity, (2) that it does so by
reducing real wages and raising real profits, (3) that
this output-enhancing redistribution occurs because
money wages lag behind prices, and (4) that this
wage lag persists as long as inflation is sustained.
Like Hume, he did not explain why the lag would
persist nor why wages would not eventually catch up
with prices once inflationary expectations had fully
adjusted to actual inflation. His analysis is largely
silent about inflation anticipations; he did not incor-
porate them into his Phillips curve.
Finally, he disagreed with Hume over the desir-
ability of exploiting the Phillips curve for policy
purposes. Hume clearly believed that the policy
authorities in the closed world economy should ex-
ploit the curve, using monetary gold inflation to
stimulate employment. Hume [8, pp. 39-40] says as
much in his advice to the policymaker.
The good policy of the magistrate consists only in
keeping [money], if possible still encreasing; be-
cause, by that means, he keeps alive a spirit of
industry in the nation, and encreases the stock of
labor, in which consists all real power and riches.
In contrast, Thornton opposed the exploitation of
the Phillips curve for policy purposes. Such ex-
ploitation involved inflation, which he saw as an
unmitigated evil. All inflationary policy, he [19,
p. 239] said, is “attended with a proportionate hard-
ship and injustice.” True, output and employment
would rise. But such gains, he thought, would be
far too small to be worth the costs (uncertainty, in-
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short, the Phillips curve at the economy’s normal
level of operations was very steeply sloped, allowing
little increase in output per unit rise in inflation.
Thus while “paper possesses the faculty of enlarging
the quantity of commodities by giving life to some
new industry,” the unfavorable tradeoff ensures that
“the increase of industry will by no means keep pace
with the augmentation of paper.” Moreover, because
the economy normally operates close to its absolute
full capacity ceiling, stimulative policy will quickly
reach the point where
it is obvious that the antecedently idle persons to
whom we may suppose the [monetary inflation] to
give employ, are limited in number; and that,
therefore, if the encreased issue is indefinite, it
will set to work labourers, of whom a part will be
drawn from other, and, perhaps, no less useful
occupations.
On these grounds he [19, p. 236] concluded that
there exist narrow “bounds to the benefit which is
to be derived from an augmentation of paper; and,
also, that a liberal, or, at most, a large increase of it,
will have all the advantageous effects of the most
extravagant emission.”
The Attwood-Mill Debate
The Phillips curve concept continued to flourish in
the hands of more than one British classical writer
after Henry Thornton. That this is so is evident
from a glance at the celebrated interchange between
Thomas Attwood (1783-1856) and John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873) in the 1820s. Attwood, an inflationist
proponent of inconvertible paper currency regimes
and full employment at any cost, believed in a stable
long-run tradeoff relationship of the form U=g(P)
where U and P denote unemployment and the price
level, both taken relative to their normal (base
period) values. Attwood used this relation, in which
the inflation variable enters as a price level rather
than its Hume-Thornton rate of change, to argue
(1) that high unemployment stems from low prices,
(2) that low unemployment emanates from high
prices, and (3) that the government can and should
achieve a zero target rate of unemployment with
inflationary monetary expansion. For him nothing
short of absolute full employment would suffice. Said
he [3, p. 467], “so long as any number of industrious
honest workmen in the Kingdom are out of employ-
ment, supposing such deficiency of employment not
to be local but general, I should think it the duty,
and certainly the interest, of Government, to continue
the depreciation of the currency until full employ-
ment is obtained and general prosperity.” “Restore
the depreciated state of the currency,” he [2, p. 66]
declared, and “you restore everything that constitutes
the commercial prosperity of the nation.”
Opposing him was John Stuart Mill who reasoned
in terms of the relationship U=g(P-P
E) where U
is the discrepancy between unemployment and its
natural steady-state level, P is the price level, and P
E
is its expected or perceived level. Using this relation-
ship, Mill argued (1) that tradeoffs are temporary,
(2) that they stem from unexpected price changes
and vanish once perceptions adjust to reality, and
(3) that, contrary to Attwood, one cannot peg real
activity at arbitrarily low levels simply by pegging a
nominal price (or inflation) variable since the two
variables are independent of each other in steady-
state equilibrium [9].
To be sure, Mill admitted that a temporary infla-
tionary stimulus is possible. It is true, he [13, p. 79]
said, that an unexpected inflation, if misperceived as a
rise in relative prices, “may create a false opinion of
an increase of demand; which false opinion leads, as
the reality would do, to an increase of production.”
But it is also true that the real expansion is “followed
. . . by a fatal revulsion as soon as the delusion
ceases.” In other words, once producers correctly
perceive price increases as nominal rather than real,
economic activity reverts to its steady-state level,
but only after undergoing a temporary recession to
correct for the excesses of the inflationary boom.
In Mill’s view, the steady-state Phillips curve is a
vertical line at the economy’s natural rate of unem-
ployment. To assert otherwise (as Attwood did), he
thought, was to argue that people can be fooled per-
petually into believing that nominal gains are real
and that commodities can be created from paper
money expansion. But according to Mill, one cannot
fool all the people all the time. Money illusion, he
contended, is not permanent. Attempts to peg real
activity are therefore bound to be futile. Inflation
cannot permanently stimulate activity. Mill’s reply
to Attwood dispels the notion that expectations-
augmented Phillips curves and the natural rate hy-
pothesis are of recent origin.
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As noted above, Hume and Thornton helped lay
the theoretical foundations of the particular Phillips
curve relationship U=g(dP/dt). It was Irving
Fisher, however, who provided the first statistical
evidence of that relationship [7]. In his 1926
International Labour Review article, “A Statistical
Relationship Between Unemployment and Price
Changes,” he investigated the correlation between
unemployment U and lagged price changes (dP/dt)L,
where the subscript L denotes a linear distributed lag
(Fisher himself being the inventor of the lag distri-
bution concept) on the price-change variable. Using
monthly U. S. data for the period 1915-1925, he
obtained correlation coefficients as high as 90 percent
between the two variables. Likewise, his time series
chart displayed a similar strong correspondence be-
tween lagged price changes and employment (see
Figure 2). From this evidence he concluded that
there was indeed a strong relationship between them.
He [7, p. 502] also concluded that the relationship
was causal as well as empirical, that causality runs
undirectionally from price changes to unemployment,
and that there are good theoretical reasons for this
being so. His theory of price-to-unemployment
causality relies on fixed contracts, the inertia of
custom, and other inhibiting factors that prevent
costs from adjusting as fast as prices when prices
change. Owing to the lag of costs behind prices,
changes in the latter affect profits and thereby the
level of real activity and employment. Via this link-
age, causality, he argued, runs from inflation to un-
employment as confirmed by his finding that the
former variable leads the latter.
Jan Tinbergen
Although he presented no formal econometric
equations, Fisher was the first to offer empirical
corroboration of the Phillips curve’s market clearing
version U=g(dP/dt) according to which causality
runs from inflation to unemployment. By contrast,
Jan Tinbergen [4] in 1936 was the first to estimate
the alternative shift-augmented wage-change version
w=f(U)+Z in which causality runs from unem-
ployment or some equivalent measure of demand
pressure in the labor market to the wage inflation
rate and a vector of shift variables enters to affect
the wage-unemployment tradeoff. More precisely,
his equation was of the form dW=F(E,dP-1)
where dW is the change in money wages, E is
employment relative to its normal (i.e., trend) level,
and the lagged price-change variable dP-1 represents
catch-up or cost-of-living wage adjustment factors
thought capable of shifting the curve. Thus in his
“An Economic Policy for 1936” he presents the
expression dW = 0.16 E + 0.27 dP-1 in which the
numerical coefficients are estimated from the Nether-
lands data for the period 1923-1933.
About this equation three things must be said. It
was the first econometric Phillips curve equation ever
to appear in print. It also was the first to explain
the tradeoff in terms of the law of supply and demand
according to which the price of any good or service
(including labor) varies in proportion to the excess
demand for it. In other words, for the first time the
Phillips curve was interpreted as a wage-reaction
function relating the disequilibrium response of
wages to demand pressure in the labor market, this
pressure being measured by employment relative to
trend. Finally, as mentioned above, Tinbergen’s
equation was the first to include a price change shift
variable to account for observed movements in the
wage-employment relationship. In these respects, it
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wise represented the Phillips curve as a demand-
pressure wage-response function subject to shifts
owing to changes in the cost of living.
Tinbergen returned to the Phillips curve issue
once again in his Business Cycles in the United
Kingdom 1870-1914, published in 1951 fully seven
years before Phillips’ contribution. There, using W
to denote wages and E to denote employment, he [21,
p. 50] writes the Phillips curve equation as
and gives it the excess-demand wage-reaction inter-
pretation. “The theory expressed” in the equation,
he says, “may be given the well-known formulation
that a high unemployment figure ‘exerts a pressure
on’ the wage rate and that, on the other hand, a
small unemployment figure causes wages to go up.”
He also notes that the equation’s empirical fit might
be improved if the demand-pressure variable were
entered nonlinearly and that this could be accomp-
lished by replacing the employment variable E with
the inverse of the unemployment rate U
-1. Finally,
he suggested adding variables representing cost-of-
living changes and the degree of unionization of
the labor force to the equation to improve its sta-
tistical fit. On all of these innovations he pioneered
the practice of fitting econometric Phillips curve
equations.
Klein and Goldberger
Lawrence Klein and Arthur Goldberger also esti-
mated econometric inflation-unemployment equations
before Phillips. In their famous 1955 study An
Econometric Model of the United States, 1929-1952,
they [11, p. 19] presented a wage-change Phillips
curve equation of the form dW=F(U,dP-1). More
precisely, their equation was
where U is total unemployment, t is a time trend in
years (t=1 in 1929), and the other variables are as
defined above.
Like Tinbergen, Klein and Goldberger expressed
the wage inflation variable in first difference rather
than percentage rate of change form. Besides includ-
ing a time trend variable, they also entered the unem-
ployment variable linearly rather than nonlinearly
into their equation. Except for these minor differ-
ences, their equation is virtually the same as the later
formulations of Phillips and R. G. Lipsey, who
clarified and extended Phillips’ work. And like those
latter writers, Klein and Goldberger interpreted their
equation as a wage-reaction function in which money
wages change in response to excess labor demand in
an effort to clear the market. According to them
[11, p. 18]
the main reasoning behind this equation is that of
the law of supply and demand. Money wage rates
move in response to excess supply or excess demand
in the labor market. High unemployment repre-
sents high excess supply, and low unemployment
below customary frictional levels represents excess
demand.
Here is the essence of the Phillips-Lipsey interpre-
tation, an interpretation that also runs in terms of
the law of supply and demand.
A. J. Brown and Paul Sultan
As documented above, the theoretical, empirical,
and econometric foundations of the Phillips curve
had been thoroughly established by the mid-1950s
several years in advance of Phillips’ own contribution.
It remained, however, for someone to present a
Phillips-type relationship on a statistical scatter dia-
gram and then to draw the familiar downward-
sloping convex tradeoff curve that bears his name.
Credit for being the first to accomplish these tasks
goes not to Phillips himself but rather to two other
economists, A. J. Brown and Paul Sultan.
The former, in his 1955 volume The Great Infla-
tion 1939-1951, presented scatter diagrams similar to
Phillips’ (see Figure 3) that plotted annual wage
inflation rates against unemployment rates for the
United Kingdom for the periods 1880-1914 and 1920-
1951, and for the United States for the period 1921-
1948. From these charts Brown [5, pp. 91-101]
concluded (1) that the two variables are inversely
related, and (2) that the relationship between them
is nonlinear since wages change at faster rates at
low than at high rates of unemployment. He also
used his charts to estimate the critical noninflationary
level of unemployment below which wage inflation
exceeds productivity growth so that prices rise. He
did not, however, fit a curve to his data. Thus,
although he presented a Phillips-type graph, he failed
to draw the eye-catching curve made famous by
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Thirlwall’s [18] contention that the curve should
bear Brown’s name rather than Phillips’.
Priority for drawing the Phillips curve goes to
Paul Sultan, whose contribution predates Phillips’
by one year. Thus, in his 1957 textbook Labor Eco-
nomics, Sultan presents the curve in a diagram (see
Figure 4) described by him [17, p. 555] as follows :
the vertical scale measures the annual changes in
the price level expressed as a percentage, while the
horizontal scale measures the percentage of the
work force unemployed. The line relating unem-
ployment to inflation . . . is strictly hypothetical,
but it suggests that the tighter the employment
situation the greater the hazard of inflation . . . .
Assuming that a fairly precise functional relation-
ship exists between inflation and the level of em-
ployment, it is possible to determine the “safe”
degree of full employment. In our hypothetical
case, we are assuming that when unemployment is
less than 2 percent of the work force, we face the
dangers of inflation. And when unemployment is
larger than 6 percent, we face the problem of
serious deflation.
Here is the first diagrammatic representation of the
price-change Phillips curve as a stable tradeoff rela-
tionship p=f(U) between inflation and unemploy-
ment. On the basis of this diagram, three writers [1]
recently have suggested that the Phillips curve could
with equal justification be called the Sultan schedule.
Concluding Comments
Given the evidence presented in the preceding
paragraphs, the label “Phillips curve tradeoff” must
be judged both misleading and incomplete. For, as
documented above, Phillips was far from the first to
postulate an inflation-unemployment tradeoff or to
draw the curve bearing his name. Even the econo-
metric wage-price equations employed in modern
Phillips curve analysis together with their excess
demand and alternative market clearing interpreta-
tions long predate Phillips. In short, Phillips and
his successors inherited (albeit unknowingly) these
concepts; they did not invent them. In this sense at
least, their work may be said to constitute the con-
tinuation rather than the origin of Phillips curve
analysis.
Still, it was Phillips’ formulation and not those of
his predecessors that captured the attention of the
economics profession. One must ask why this was so.
Certainly it cannot be explained by the novelty of his
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innovations at the time he presented them. Nor can choices, a menu from which the authorities could
it be attributed to any originality in his explanation select the best (or least undesirable) inflation-
of his curve. His theory was simply the law of supply unemployment combination and then use their policy
and demand according to which the price of any instruments to attain it. By providing a ready-made
commodity or service (including labor) changes at a justification for discretionary intervention and acti-
rate proportional to the excess demand for it. This vist fine tuning, this interpretation helped make the
explanation of course had been advanced by Tin- Phillips curve immensely popular among Keynesian
bergen years before Phillips. Rather his phenomenal policy advisors. Third was Phillips’ presentation of
success probably stemmed from three factors. First his curve at just the right time to satisfy the Key-
was his striking finding of the apparent near 100-year nesians’ search for an explanation of how changes in
empirical stability of his curve, a stability not sus- nominal income divide into price and quantity com-
pected before. Second was the persuasive early ex- ponents. Whatever the reason, his name alone was
positions of his work provided by such influential attached to the tradeoff concept even though at least
economists as Lipsey [12], and Samuelson and Solow ten predecessors over a period of roughly 250 years
[16]. Especially important was the Samuelson-Solow also shared in its formulation.
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